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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This appeal concerns the standard courts should use 
when reviewing a denial of a request for benefits under an 
ERISA plan by an insurance company which, pursuant to 
a contract with an employing company, both determines 
eligibility for benefits, and pays those benefits out of its 
own funds. This question, and variations thereof, have 
bedeviled the federal courts since considered dicta in 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), 
gave opaque direction about how courts should review 
discretionary benefits denials by potentially conflicted 
ERISA fiduciaries. In Firestone, the Court instructed that 
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard was appropriate but 
that a conflict of interest should be considered as a "factor" 
in applying this standard. 
 
Courts of appeals have taken different approaches to 
integrating these seemingly incongruous directions when 
reviewing decisions of insurance companies that fund a 
plan and are also ERISA plan administrators. Following the 
lead of five other such courts, we hold that, when an 
insurance company both funds and administers benefits, it 
is generally acting under a conflict that warrants a 
heightened form of the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review. In reaching this conclusion, we are cognizant of the 
previous cases in which we have been highly deferential to 
decisions of an employer who funds and administers a 
benefit plan, a practice grounded in the belief that the 
structural incentives to deny meritorious claims are 
generally outweighed by the opposing incentives to grant 
 
                                2 
  
them--such as the "incentives to avoid the loss of morale 
and higher wage demands that could result from denials of 
benefits." Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1335 (3d Cir. 
1991). However, we conclude that these incentives 
(assuming their existence) do not apply with the same force 
to an insurance company that pays benefits out of its own 
coffers. The relationship with the welfare of the 
beneficiaries is more attenuated, and there are problems of 
imperfect information. In the insurance company-as- 
funder-and-administrator context, the fund from which 
monies are paid is the same fund from which the insurance 
company reaps its profits. This is in contrast to the 
actuarially determined benefit funds typically maintained 
by employers (especially in the pension area) that usually 
cannot be recouped by the employer or directly redound to 
its benefit. Our rule is also informed by the understanding 
that "smoking gun" direct evidence of purposeful bias is 
rare in these cases so that, without more searching review, 
benefits decisions will be virtually immunized. 
 
The courts of appeals that have forged the trail in this 
area have presented different formulations of the 
heightened standard. Some courts, led by the Eleventh 
Circuit, have established a standard approaching de novo 
review, shifting the burden to the defendant company to 
explain its decisions. However, we side with the majority of 
courts of appeals, which apply a sliding scale method, 
intensifying the degree of scrutiny to match the degree of 
the conflict. 
 
In this case, applying a heightened degree of scrutiny 
because of the financial conflict, we conclude that there is 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
defendant, Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it concluded that 
the plaintiff, Maria Pinto, an employee of Reliance 
Standard's client Rhone-Poulenc Corporation, was not 
totally disabled by her cardiac condition and therefore did 
not deserve long-term disability benefits. Our heightened 
review allows us to take notice of discrete factors 
suggesting that a conflict may have influenced the 
administrator's decision. First, Reliance Standard's reversal 
of its initial decision to grant benefits was itself 
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questionable. Second, its final report credited the evidence 
favorable to denial while inadequately explaining why it 
rejected the contrary evidence--the same evidence on the 
basis of which it had initially determined to award benefits. 
Third, while Reliance Standard relies on the fact that two 
physicians found Pinto not to be totally disabled while two 
others disagreed, one of the doctors on whom Reliance 
Standard relied was not a cardiologist but a pulmonologist, 
and he found Pinto's condition satisfactory only from his 
(pulmonary) vantage point, whereas the disability dispute is 
over a condition that is cardiological in nature. 
 
In light of the evidence in the record, we conclude that a 
factfinder could find that Reliance Standard's actions were 
arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, we will reverse the 
grant of summary judgment and remand to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
Pinto was an accounting clerk for Rhone-Poulenc from 
1986 to 1991. In July 1991, she stopped working because 
of a heart condition, which was diagnosed as mitral 
stenosis and cardiac asthma. After receiving short-term 
benefits from Rhone-Poulenc, she applied, in June 1992, 
for long-term disability (LTD) benefits from Reliance 
Standard, which had contracted to administer and pay LTD 
benefits under Rhone-Poulenc's ERISA plan. The policy 
provides benefits for individuals who submit "satisfactory 
proof " of "Total Disability" to Reliance Standard. In 
pertinent part, an employee is "Totally Disabled" when, 
"after a Monthly Benefit has been paid for 24 months, an 
Insured cannot perform the material duties of any 
occupation." It is undisputed that Reliance Standard had 
discretion to interpret the plan. 
 
When Pinto applied for LTD benefits, Dr. Alan Bahler, her 
treating physician since 1977, sent Reliance Standard a 
diagnosis of her condition, which was confirmed by a 
cardiac catheterization. He reported that she had mitral 
stenosis secondary to rheumatic heart disease, which 
brings on shortness of breath, and orthopnea (the inability 
to breathe well without sitting erect) with borderline 
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congestive heart failure. Bahler further attested that Pinto 
had developed symptoms of mitral valvular dysfunction, 
including symptoms of cardiac asthma and early congestive 
heart failure, worsening exercise tolerance, and 
palpitations. He concluded that "[h]er present condition 
precludes her from actively working even at a clerical level 
. . . [h]er only viable option at the present time is continued 
medical therapy, sedentary life style, and avoidance of high 
stress situations that could precipitate her cardiac asthma." 
In December 1992 and April and August 1993, Bahler 
recertified Pinto's total disability. In the 1993 certification, 
Bahler indicated that Pinto could not stand for long, could 
not lift ten pound objects, could not be exposed to stress, 
and should remain sedentary. 
 
In October 1992, Reliance Standard sent Pinto a letter 
granting her application for long term benefits. It advised 
her that periodic medical certification would be required, 
and requested that she promptly apply for social security 
disability benefits. In December 1992, Pinto certified, in 
connection with a disability review by Reliance Standard, 
that she had not worked in any capacity, and that she 
remained under treatment. She noted that she had been 
hospitalized for two days in November of that year, when 
she had been treated for bronchial asthma and acute 
bronchitis. In April 1993, Pinto recertified that she was 
disabled and represented that she had recently been 
treated by two physicians. 
 
Pinto also applied for Social Security Disability benefits. 
In May 1993, the Social Security Administration (SSA) 
denied Pinto's application, finding her not disabled. She 
forwarded a copy of the determination letter to Reliance 
Standard. Reliance Standard strongly encouraged Pinto to 
appeal the adverse decision, which she did. In September 
1993, SSA denied Pinto's appeal, concluding that her 
asthma attacks could be controlled by medication, that her 
rheumatic heart disease was stable, and that her shortness 
of breath did not preclude work. One month later, Reliance 
Standard requested that Dr. Bahler relay to it the specific 
limitations that prevented Pinto from being an accounting 
clerk. Dr. Bahler responded by referring to his previous 
reports. 
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In November 1993, Reliance Standard terminated Pinto's 
benefits. Its denial letter cited the SSA denial, and the 
language tracked that of the denial.1 It also asserted: "Your 
physician has stated that you can perform the duties of a 
sedentary occupation within your present physical 
limitations and restrictions." Reliance Standard appeared to 
read Dr. Bahler's assertion that Pinto needed to maintain a 
sedentary lifestyle as a statement that she could perform 
sedentary work, and the described limitations to define 
absolutely the limits of her potential (i.e., it apparently read 
his statement that she could not lift ten pound items to 
imply that she could regularly lift less weighty items). 
 
Pinto requested a review of this decision. Dr. Bahler 
wrote Reliance Standard in January 1994, explaining 
Pinto's medical history and affirming his determination that 
Pinto's "only viable option at the present time is continued 
medical therapy, sedentary life style, and avoidance of high 
stress situations that could precipitate her cardiac asthma. 
. . . Pinto is totally and permanently disabled at this time 
and therefore is unfit to perform any task or job in the 
labor market." Then, in February 1994, the SSA reversed 
its earlier denial and awarded her benefits. It determined 
that she had a severe cardiac condition and that she was 
too disabled to perform any job for which she had the 
requisite skills. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The SSA denial stated: 
 
       * You have asthma. However, these attacks can be c ontrolled with 
       prescribed medication. 
 
       * You have experienced heart problems. However, fo llowing a 
       recovery period, you are able to work. 
 
       * The evidence shows no other condition which sign ificantly limits 
       your ability to work. 
 
The Reliance Standard revocation letter stated: 
 
       1) if you have asthma it can be controlled by medi cation, 
 
       2) your heart condition is stable, 
 
       3) your shortness of breath according to the Socia l Security 
       Administration Denial, the tests show you are still able to work. 
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In the early summer of 1994, Reliance Standard retained 
Dr. Martin I. Rosenthal, an internist, who examined Pinto 
and reviewed Dr. Bahler's echocardiogram and cardiac 
catheterization studies. He recommended pulmonary 
testing and, after some initial ambivalence, concluded that 
Pinto was not totally disabled. In November (following 
Rosenthal's suggestion), Dr. Robert A. Capone, a 
pulmonologist, examined Pinto, and initially declined to 
decide whether she had a disabling reactive airways disease 
because he thought therapeutic intervention might make a 
difference. However, when pressed by Reliance Standard in 
December (no therapeutic interaction had occurred between 
November and December) he indicated that he did not 
think that any respiratory condition prohibited her from 
working, and, while noting the inadequacy of the available 
data, concluded that he did "not believe that there is a 
strong likelihood of reactive airways disease." 
 
After Dr. Rosenthal's examination but before Dr. 
Capone's, a Reliance Standard staff worker, in an internal 
document, recommended reestablishing Pinto's benefits 
pending the pulmonary testing. However, Reliance Standard 
decided to do the opposite, holding the resumption of 
benefits until the pulmonary testing. It is noteworthy that 
the same staff worker had similarly recommended a 
resumption of benefits in April because she thought 
Reliance Standard had misunderstood Dr. Bahler's 
assertion that Pinto must be sedentary to mean sedentary 
work instead of sedentary lifestyle. In February 1995, 
Reliance Standard rejected Pinto's appeal of its earlier 
benefits reversal. It wrote her that "Dr. Bahler, Dr. 
Rosenthal, and Dr. Capone have all indicated you retain the 
physical functional capacity to engage in sedentary work. 
The subsequent correlation of this activity level with the 
material duties of your occupation substantiated that you 
are capable of performing the material duties of your 
regular occupation." 
 
In January 1996, Pinto was examined by Dr. Rowland D. 
Goodman, II, a heart and chest specialist who shares 
offices with Dr. Bahler. Dr. Goodman reviewed her medical 
records, examined her, and concluded that she suffered 
from rheumatic heart disease with mitral stenosis and that 
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she was totally disabled. Goodman's report was unavailable 
to Reliance Standard when making the initial decision, but 
was used when making the decision in question here (after 
the remand discussed infra). 
 
In July 1996, Pinto filed the present ERISA suit in the 
District Court under 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(b), which allows 
for a beneficiary to sue for "benefits due to him under the 
terms of the plan." In January 1997, Reliance Standard 
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the 
decision was discretionary, and not arbitrary and 
capricious. The District Court agreed and granted the 
motion. Pinto appealed. In an unpublished opinion (hence 
non-precedential under our Internal Operating Procedures 
S 5.3), we vacated the judgment and remanded, see Pinto v. 
Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 156 F.3d 1225 (Table) (3d Cir. 
May 28, 1998) (No. 97-5297), concluding that Reliance 
Standard had apparently misinterpreted Dr. Bahler's 
diagnosis when it stated that "all" of the physicians who 
had examined her determined that Pinto had the 
"functional capacity to engage in sedentary work." Given 
the disconnect between this interpretation of Dr. Bahler's 
diagnosis and his own repeated conclusion that Pinto was 
unfit for any work, we stated that 
 
       we cannot confidently rule that Reliance's decision was 
       not arbitrary and capricious. We are unsure whether 
       Reliance properly reviewed Dr. Bahler's reports or 
       whether it misinterpreted his conclusions. Moreover, 
       we do not know whether it would have made the same 
       decision based solely on Dr. Rosenthal and Dr. 
       Capone's evaluations. Therefore, these are matters that 
       will require reconsideration by Reliance. 
 
We also briefly discussed the problem of the standard of 
review for situations where an insurer administers benefits 
out of its own funds: 
 
       We are not convinced that such a dual role presents 
       the type of conflict of interest that would warrant 
       discarding the arbitrary and capricious standard, but 
       in any event under Firestone such a conflict would 
       merely be a factor in the court's determination whether 
       there has been an abuse of discretion. . . . We . . . 
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       review Reliance's determination under an arbitrary and 
       capricious standard, taking into account the 
       circumstances. 
 
Reliance Standard dutifully reconsidered, and affirmed its 
earlier denial. In August, an Assistant Manager of Quality 
Review, Richard D. Walsh, issued a letter explaining the 
rejection. The letter opined that, although Dr. Bahler had 
stated that Pinto should not work, the limitations that he 
put on her activity would not preclude her from working. 
Walsh cited the United States Department of Labor's The 
Revised Handbook for Analyzing Jobs as evidence that the 
job of accounting clerk is "sedentary." He also cited the 
conclusions of Drs. Rosenthal and Capone. As regards Dr. 
Goodman's examination, Walsh stated that he had 
"provided no new findings, restrictions, or limitations to 
substantiate his conclusion," and commented on the fact 
that he shares a mailing address with Dr. Bahler, implicitly 
suggesting that Goodman's conclusions might be biased by 
his association with Dr. Bahler. Walsh did not mention 
Pinto's successful appeal of the Social Security denial. 
Although there is no record evidence that Reliance 
Standard knew of Social Security's reversal, it must have 
known of it at least after the case was remanded as it is 
mentioned in the previous panel's opinion. 
 
On remand, the District Court again granted summary 
judgment for Reliance Standard. Although it purported to 
apply the arbitrary and capricious standard "shaped by the 
circumstances of the inherent conflict of interest," it 
proceeded to explain that "an administrator's decision will 
only be overturned if it is without reason, unsupported by 
substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law." Pinto 
v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., No 96-3508 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 
1998). The court concluded that there was not an issue of 
material fact as to whether Reliance Standard had acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously. Of the rejection of Dr. Bahler's 
conclusions in favor of those of its own doctors, the court 
stated that "[s]uch a determination based on independent 
medical evaluations is not arbitrary and capricious, even 
when Reliance Standard's dual role as both insurer and 
decisionmaker is taken into account." Id. This appeal 
followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291, and our standard of review is plenary. 
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II. Reviewing Conflicted Decisions 
 
A. Firestone 
 
Our analysis of the issue in this case must begin with 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
Prior to Firestone, courts had adopted different approaches 
to the conflict of interest problem under ERISA, many 
choosing to vary the degree of deference they gave ERISA 
benefits administrators operating under a conflict of 
interest. See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 
F.2d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1990) (collecting cases). 
However, as one court of appeals has stated, "the Supreme 
Court [in Firestone] . . . swept the standard of review board 
clear." De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1185 (4th 
Cir. 1989). 
 
Firestone began when a group of plaintiffs sued their 
employer, who was also the ERISA plan administrator, for 
wrongfully terminating welfare and pension benefits. A 
panel of this court considered the relevant principles of 
trust law, with special attention to the rationales for the 
general deference given to impartial trustees, concluding 
that those reasons carry little or no force when trustees are 
in a position to profit from denying trust benefits. See 
Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 145 (3d 
Cir. 1987). We also considered the incentives and actual 
relationship of the parties, and the fact that the benefit 
plan was contracted for and its terms subject to 
negotiation. Id. We concluded that trust and contract 
principles both dictated that our review of the conflicted 
benefits denial should be de novo, giving no deference to 
either the administrator's or participants' interpretations. 
We essentially applied "the principles governing 
construction of contracts between parties bargaining at 
arms length." Id. 
 
The Supreme Court affirmed the specific holding in that 
case--that the administrator's decision should be reviewed 
de novo, giving no deference to either party--but used a 
significantly different rationale. The Court began by stating 
that interpretation of ERISA should be governed by the 
common law of trusts, and then grounded the de novo 
 
                                10 
  
review on the fact that the plan gave the administrator no 
discretion to interpret the plan. See Firestone , 489 U.S. at 
111. The Court observed that trust principles dictated that 
fiduciaries should be given no deference when making non- 
discretionary decisions, see 489 U.S. at 111; see also supra 
note 2. It then turned to a brief discussion pertinent to this 
case, noting that "a deferential standard of review [is] 
appropriate when a trustee exercises discretionary powers,"2 
but that "if a benefit plan gives discretion to an 
administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict 
of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a "factor in 
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion." Id. at 
115 (quoting Restatement (Second) of TrustsS 187, cmt. d 
(1959)) (emphasis added). Since Firestone, courts have 
struggled to give effect to this delphic statement, and to 
determine both what constitutes a conflict of interest and 
how a conflict should affect the scrutiny of an 
administrator's decision to deny benefits. The next two 
Sections discuss these problems as applied to an 
independent insurer who is empowered with discretion to 
determine who deserves benefits under a plan which it 
funds. 
 
B. What Constitutes A Conflict? 
 
Employers typically structure the relationship of ERISA 
plan administration, interpretation, and funding in one of 
three ways. First, the employer may fund a plan and pay an 
independent third party to interpret the plan and make 
plan benefits determinations. Second, the employer may 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In an article entitled The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 S. Ct. 
Rev. 207, Professor John H. Langbein argues that the Supreme Court's 
correlation of arbitrary and capricious review with discretionary 
decisions and de novo review with nondiscretionary decisions has no 
foundation in the common law of trusts. See id. at 219. He submits that 
in our opinion in Bruch we were "following trust-law tradition in 
scrutinizing fiduciary conduct more closely when conflict of interest is 
suspected." Id. at 217. Langbein correctly predicted that companies 
would quickly redraft their plans to confer unambiguous grants of 
discretion so as to garner deferential review, see id. at 221, and also 
predicted that the problems of how courts should deal with conflicted 
fiduciaries would resurface, see id. at 222. 
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establish a plan, ensure its liquidity, and create an internal 
benefits committee vested with the discretion to interpret 
the plan's terms and administer benefits. Third, the 
employer may pay an independent insurance company to 
fund, interpret, and administer a plan. While we have 
previously held that the first two arrangements do not, in 
themselves, typically constitute the kind of conflict of 
interest mentioned in Firestone, see infra Section E, today 
we address the third arrangement for the first time, 
concluding that it generally presents a conflict and thus 
invites a heightened standard of review.3  Our sister circuits 
that have examined this issue have fallen into two basic 
camps. Most hold that the nature of the relationship 
between the funds, the decision, and the beneficiary invites 
self-dealing and therefore requires closer scrutiny, but 
others allow heightened review only if there is independent 
evidence that the conflict infected a particular benefits 
denial. 
 
C. Courts of Appeals Holding that the Independent 
       Insurance Company Administrator is Operating 
       under an Inherent Conflict 
 
The Eleventh Circuit was the first to conclude that an 
insurance company acts under a "strong conflict of 
interest" when both administering and paying out benefits 
under an ERISA plan. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990). It held that 
there is 
 
       an inherent conflict between the roles assumed by an 
       insurance company that administers claims under a 
       policy it issued. . . . Because an insurance company 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. There may be, of course, variations on each of these arrangements. 
For example, an employer may pay out of a fund fixed by actuarial 
tables, which the employer only pays into, but cannot withdraw from, or 
one from which the employer may withdraw unused assets. An 
insurance company that administers funds might charge the employing 
company a fixed fee, or the fee could be closely dependent on the 
benefits payouts. Any such difference might affect a district court's 
assessment of the incentives of an administrator/insurer and therefore 
affect the nature of its review. 
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       pays out to beneficiaries from its own assets rather 
       than the assets of a trust, its fiduciary role lies in 
       perpetual conflict with its profit-making role as a 
       business. Id. at 1561 (internal quotations omitted). The 
       Brown court noted that a structural conflict of interest 
       may unconsciously encourage even a principled 
       fiduciary to make decisions that are not solely in the 
       interest of the beneficiary. See id. at 1565. Under this 
       view, although the arrangement is not illegal or 
       inappropriate under ERISA, it warrants heightened 
       scrutiny. "[J]udicial hesitation to inquire into the 
       fiduciary's motives will leave the beneficiaries 
       unprotected unless the existence of a substantial 
       conflicting interest shifts the burden to thefiduciary to 
       demonstrate that its decision is not infected with self- 
       interest." Id. 
 
In Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs. , 3 F.3d 80 
(4th Cir. 1993), the Fourth Circuit, like the Eleventh, 
concluded that a "conflict flows inherently from the nature 
of the relationship" when an employer contracts with an 
insurance company to provide and determine ERISA 
benefits. Id. at 86. 
 
       Undoubtedly, [Blue Cross's] profit from the insurance 
       contract depends on whether the claims allowed exceed 
       the assumed risks. To the extent that Blue Cross has 
       discretion to avoid paying claims, it thereby promotes 
       the potential for its own profit. . . . Even the most 
       careful and sensitive fiduciary in those circumstances 
       may unconsciously favor its profit interest over the 
       interests of the plan, leaving beneficiaries less 
       protected than when the trustee acts without self- 
       interest and solely for the benefit of the plan. 
 
Id. at 86-87. See also Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 
149, 154 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Doe). The Fifth Circuit, in 
a recent en banc discussion, also affirmed a commitment to 
heightened scrutiny of decisions by an insurer who 
administers benefits from its own funds. In Vega v. Nat'l 
Life Ins. Serv., Inc., 188 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 1999), the plan 
administrator insurance company was a subsidiary of the 
plan insurer (the court treated the interests as aligned), and 
while the court recognized that if the company denied 
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meritorious claims, its "reputation may suffer as a result 
and others may be less willing to enter into contracts where 
the company has discretion to decide claims," id. at 295 
n.8, it concluded that these incentives did not outweigh the 
strong incentive to self-deal, see id. at 295-98. The Tenth 
Circuit and Eighth Circuits have also concluded that when 
an insurance company acts as the administrator for 
benefits coming from its own funds, the conflict warrants a 
more searching review. See Armstrong v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 
128 F.3d 1263 (8th Cir. 1997); Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of Okla., 24 F.3d 118, 120-22 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing 
Doe). 
 
D. Courts of Appeals Holding that the Independent 
       Insurance Company Structural Relationship Does 
       not Give Rise to a Conflict That Should Affect 
       Standard of Review 
 
The Seventh Circuit requires a specific demonstration 
that bias affected a decision before modifying the arbitrary 
and capricious standard when reviewing the decisions of an 
insurance company in this posture. See Mers v. Marriott 
Internat'l Group Accidental Death and Dismemberment Plan, 
144 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1998). In Mers, the benefit plan 
was insured by the American International Group (AIG), an 
independent insurer, that also was charged with 
interpreting the plan. The Mers court considered, and 
rejected, Mers's argument that less deference should be 
given to AIG's decision because it was operating under a 
conflict of interest. "We presume," it held,"that a fiduciary 
is acting neutrally unless a claimant shows by providing 
specific evidence of actual bias that there is a significant 
conflict." Id. at 1020. Relying on what it styled as law and 
economics principles, the court concluded that the 
requested payout in that case was slight compared to the 
company's bottom line, and that it is in a company's best 
long-term interest to award meritorious claims so that 
employees and employers will think and speak well of it, 
and seek business with it. Id. at 1021. Neutrality, opined 
the panel, begets business success, while self-dealing hurts 
it. Id. Therefore, a claimant bears the burden of providing 
specific evidence of a "significant conflict" (without 
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suggesting what that would entail), or specific evidence of 
bias. Id. at 1020. 
 
The Second Circuit, like the Seventh, requires evidence 
that a conflict actually infected the decision before it uses 
anything but the most deferential review of a fiduciary's 
determination. See Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield, 106 F.3d 475 (2d Cir. 1997); Sullivan v. LTV 
Aerospace & Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255-56 (2d Cir. 
1996); Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 440-44 
(2d Cir. 1995). It reasons not from effect but language, 
concluding that Firestone simply does not require anything 
but arbitrary and capricious review unless the plaintiff 
demonstrates how a conflict biased a fiduciary's decision. 
See Pagan, 52 F.3d at 440-44. However, it is noteworthy 
that a recent panel of the Second Circuit, in an opinion by 
Judge Oakes joined by Judges Newman and Winter, has 
expressed dissatisfaction with Pagan and Whitney. While 
recognizing that it was bound by precedent, it stated that 
"[w]e have numerous concerns regarding Pagan, which we 
believe reduces Firestone's ruling as to the impact of a 
conflict of interest." DeFelice v. American Int'l Life Assur. Co. 
of New York, 112 F.3d 61, 66 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 
E. Courts of Appeals in Which the Law is Unclear 
 
The Ninth and Sixth Circuits appear to be unsettled on 
this issue. The Ninth Circuit sometimes requires something 
more than the fact that an insurance company administers 
benefits out of its own funds to trigger heightened review. 
In Atwood v. Newmont Gold, 45 F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (9th 
Cir. 1995), the court explained that the traditional abuse of 
discretion standard applies even in conflicted situations 
unless there is specific evidence that the conflict infected 
the process. In Snow v. Standard Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 327, 331 
(9th Cir. 1996), the court followed Atwood when an 
insurance company both funded and administered an 
ERISA plan, declining to apply heightened review because 
there was no evidence that the "formal conflict led to a true 
conflict." 87 F.3d at 331. See also Lang v. Long-term 
Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., 125 F.3d 
794 (9th Cir. 1997) (only applying heightened review 
because there were independent indications that the 
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conflict biased the decisionmaking). On the other hand, in 
Tremain v. Bell Indus., Inc., 196 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 
1999), the court stated that "less deferential" arbitrary and 
capricious review was in order when the plan administrator 
was also the insurer. Cf. Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 
F.3d 1084, 1090 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999) (Because we conclude 
that Kearney is entitled to de novo review, which gives no 
deference at all to Standard's decision, we do not reach the 
question whether he would be entitled to less deferential 
review were he entitled only to review for abuse of 
discretion."). 
 
The Sixth Circuit's precedent is also unclear. In Miller v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins., 925 F.2d 979, 984-85 (6th Cir. 1991), 
the court took the insurance company's conflict of interest 
into account in the court's review of the insurance 
company's decision as an administrator, therefore applying 
a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard. On the 
other hand, in Yeager v. Reliance Standard, 88 F.3d 376, 
381-82 (6th Cir. 1996), the court did not consider the 
conflicted role of the insurance company when applying the 
arbitrary and capricious standard. 
 
F. The Law of this Circuit 
 
We have not previously addressed the precise issue 
involved in this case. There is, however, some cognate 
discussion of the standard of review in cases where an 
employer both funded and administered a plan. In thefirst 
such case, Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323 (3d Cir. 1991), 
we applied the unmodified arbitrary and capricious 
standard in reviewing a denial of benefits. While implicitly 
recognizing that there might be a risk of opportunism, we 
concluded that this alone did not constitute evidence of a 
conflict of interest, in part because the employer"had 
incentives to avoid the loss of morale and higher wage 
demands that could result from denials of benefits." Id. at 
1335. We also commented on the fact that the denial was 
individual, instead of class-based, implying that when more 
money was at stake--i.e., when a large class of beneficiaries 
requested and was denied benefits--the potential conflict 
might invite closer scrutiny. See id. 
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In the same year, we decided Kotrosits v. GATX Corp. 
Non-contributory Pension Plan for Salaried Employees , 970 
F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir. 1992), in which a benefits 
committee within a company administered the company's 
funded plan. We concluded that the unmodified arbitrary 
and capricious review was appropriate in the absence of 
specific, tangible evidence that the structural relationship 
had tainted the review process. Though we held that a 
plaintiff urging that we disregard the grant of discretion in 
a plan "has the burden of showing some reason to believe 
the exercise of discretion has been tainted," we stated that 
this burden could be met "where such a party shows the 
kind of conflict of interest that could realistically be 
expected to bias the decision makers." Id.  at 1173. If such 
a conflict were present, we suggested, "[Firestone] counsels 
in favor of withholding deference." Id. 4 By way of explaining 
why we presumed that the fiduciary was not influenced by 
self-interest in Kotrosits, we compared the assets of the 
plan (which were substantial) to the potential costs of 
paying out to the beneficiaries (which were also substantial, 
but less so), and concluded that it was unlikely that the 
company would have to replenish the plan. See id. "[T]he 
record shows no direct impact on the Plan sponsor and 
only a possibility of future indirect consequences to it." Id. 
 
In Abnathya v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40 (3d Cir. 
1993), we recognized that "some degree of conflict inevitably 
exists where an employer acts as the administrator of its 
own employee benefits plan," but held that the conflict in 
that case was insufficiently compelling to "require special 
attention or a more stringent standard of review under 
[Firestone]." Id. at 45 n.5. We noted that the company's 
contributions to the fund were fixed such that it"incurs no 
direct expense as a result of the allowance of benefits, nor 
does it benefit directly from the denial or discontinuation of 
benefits." Id. See also Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak, 113 F.3d 
433, 437 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (following the reasoning and 
language of Abnathya). 
 
While Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249 (3d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Fifth Circuit has taken this as evidence that we follow the 
Eleventh Circuit. See Vega, 188 F.3d at 297 
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Cir. 1993) is not directly on point, it demonstrates an 
openness to using heightened scrutiny when a party 
administers benefits out of its own funds. In Heasley, we 
reviewed de novo whether an ERISA plan term 
"experimental procedure" applied to a liver transplant. We 
recognized that the apparent ambiguity of this term might 
be cured if the plan provided for a party to interpret it, but 
noted that under such a scheme, the interpretation should 
be allocated to an independent party, given the threat of 
self-dealing. See id. at 1260-61 n.12. This, we said, followed 
the "general and sensible rule that courts scrutinize more 
closely decisions by plan administrators acting under a 
conflict of interest." Id. 
 
The final opinion that bears mention is our earlier 
unpublished (and therefore non-precedential) opinion in 
this very case, Pinto v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 156 F.3d 
1225 (Table) (3d Cir. May 28, 1998) (No. 97-5297). In that 
opinion we stated as follows: 
 
        We are not convinced that such a dual role presents 
       the type of conflict of interest that would warrant 
       discarding the arbitrary and capricious standard, but 
       in any event under Firestone such a conflict would 
       merely be a factor in the court's determination whether 
       there has been an abuse of discretion. 
 
        An issue similar to that before us here was 
       considered by our sister circuits in Brown v. Blue Cross 
       and Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556 (11th 
       Cir. 1990), and Miller v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 
       Corp., 925 F.2d 979 (6th Cir. 1991). The Miller court, 
       following Brown, held that in such a circumstance 
       although the insurance company's "fiduciary role lies 
       in perpetual conflict with its profit making role as a 
       business, and the conflict of interest is substantial . . . 
       the abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious 
       standard still applies, but application of the standard 
       should be shaped by the circumstances of the inherent 
       conflict of interest." Miller, 925 F.2d at 984. We too will 
       apply this standard and review Reliance's 
       determination under an arbitrary and capricious 
       standard, taking into account the circumstances. 
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        Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, an 
       administrator's decision will only be overturned if it is 
       "without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence 
       or erroneous as a matter of law. . . . the court is not 
       free to substitute its own judgment for that of the 
       defendants in determining eligibility for plan benefits." 
       It is important to recognize that ERISA does not make 
       the judges the decisionmakers. It merely assures that 
       the appropriate procedure is followed. 
 
The opinion is somewhat delphic. But the citations to 
Miller, see supra Section II.E, infra Section IV, (and also to 
Brown, see supra Section II.C, infra Section IV), both of 
which consider an insurer making decisions out of its own 
funds to be operating under an inherent conflict (in 
contrast to citations of cases of a contrary stripe), suggest 
that a heightened degree of scrutiny is required in this 
situation, an approach essentially the same as that we 
adopt in this opinion, but which we refine and clarify. See 
Part IV, adopting the "sliding scale" approach endorsed by 
a majority of our sister circuits.5 
 
III. Is Heightened Review Required When an 
       Insurance Company Both Funds and Administers 
       Benefits? 
 
Informed by our canvass of the jurisprudence, we are 
persuaded that heightened scrutiny is required when an 
insurance company is both plan administrator and funder. 
We find especially persuasive the analysis of the Fourth, 
Fifth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, and their 
conclusion that potential self-dealing warrants that 
fiduciary insurer's decisions be closely inspected. We do not 
denigrate the Seventh Circuit's suggestion that if a carrier 
denied clearly meritorious claims on a regular basis and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The purpose of the remand was to permit Reliance Standard to revisit 
its denial of benefits, because the panel thought that Reliance Standard 
had misunderstood Dr. Bahler's assessment of Pinto's capabilities. 
Therefore, the prior panel did not need to precisely assess the structural 
relationship, nor determine a method for shaping our arbitrary and 
capricious review when there is a conflict. Both issues are now squarely 
before us. 
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became notoriously unfriendly to claimants, unions and 
employees might protest and demand that their employer 
switch to a different insurance plan. Nor do we think that 
most insurance companies are unmoved by the importance 
of building a strong reputation and competing successfully 
for the business of administering plans. An insurance 
company "can hardly sell policies if it is too severe in 
administering them." Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53, 
57 (1st Cir. 1999). However, ERISA litigation generally 
arises only in close cases, and there would seem to be 
insufficient incentive for the carrier to treat borderline 
cases (unlikely to become causes celebres) with the level of 
attentiveness and solicitude that Congress imagined when 
it created ERISA "fiduciaries." Rather, insurance carriers 
have an active incentive to deny close claims in order to 
keep costs down and keep themselves competitive so that 
companies will choose to use them as their insurers, an 
economic consideration overlooked by the Seventh Circuit. 
 
To amplify, while in a perfect world, employees might 
pressure their companies to switch from self-dealing 
insurers, there are likely to be problems of imperfect 
information and information flow. Employees typically do 
not have access to information about claim-denying by 
insurance companies, and the relationship between 
employees and insurance companies is quite attenuated; so 
long as obviously meritorious claims are well-handled, it is 
unlikely that an insurance company's business will suffer 
because of its client's employees' dissatisfaction. 
Additionally, many claims for benefits are made after 
individuals have left active employment and are seeking 
pension or disability benefits. Details about the handling of 
those claims, whether responsible or irresponsible, are 
unlikely to seep into the collective knowledge of the still- 
active employees. If Pinto's claim is denied, few at Rhone- 
Poulenc will learn of it, and Reliance Standard will have 
little motive to heed the economic advice of the Seventh 
Circuit that "it is a poor business decision to resist paying 
meritorious claims for benefits." Mers, 144 F.3d at 1020. 
 
We also observe that the typical employer-funded pension 
plan is set up to be actuarially grounded, with the company 
making fixed contributions to the pension fund, and a 
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provision requiring that the money paid into the fund may 
be used only for maintaining the fund and paying out 
pensions. As we explained in Abnathya and Mitchell, the 
employer in such a circumstance "incurs no direct expense 
as a result of the allowance of benefits, nor does it benefit 
directly from the denial or discontinuation of benefits." 
Abnathya, 2 F.3d at 45 n.5; Mitchell, 113. F.3d at 437 n.4. 
In contrast, although there is nothing in the record 
indicating the precise nature of Reliance Standard's 
internal structure, the typical insurance company is 
structured such that its profits are directly affected by the 
claims it pays out and those it denies.6  
 
We recognize that the preceding section involves implicit 
assumptions about economic behavior, but such 
assumptions have become necessary in the post-Firestone 
era as we, and other courts, must somehow determine 
when a conflict warrants close scrutiny. Inasmuch as we 
are making such assumptions, however, they seem less 
exceptional than those of the Seventh Circuit, which, we 
believe, has an overly optimistic view of the flow of 
information and the sophistication of employees. 
Furthermore, while all circuits that have considered these 
questions appear to agree that some level of conflict may be 
unavoidable and not every conflict will heighten the level of 
scrutiny, the Seventh and Second Circuits alone require 
evidence of actual self dealing, and hold that the nature of 
the relationship itself can never, or almost never, affect the 
standard of review. Needless to say, Firestone  contains no 
such requirement, and its use of the word "conflict" instead 
of "direct evidence of bias" counsels against the most stern 
reading. As we opined in Kotrosits, the Firestone court 
appears, by recognizing the import of a conflict, to have 
"implicitly adopted the position . . . that, where the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We do not, of course, pretend to establish an absolute, per se rule, 
recognizing that different relationships between the parties could effect 
a 
different result. Cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Potter, 992 F. Supp. 
717 
(D.N.J. 1998) ("[A] conflict may arguably be ameliorated where, as here, 
the plan is experience-rated because the premiums charged to the 
employer are adjusted annually based on claims paid the previous year 
and thus the fiduciary's incentive to deny claims to increase profits is 
lessened, if not eliminated."). 
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claimant demonstrates that it would be inequitable to defer 
to the plan administrator, stricter scrutiny of his decision is 
in order." 970 F.2d at 1172. Finally, this is not a scenario 
where a "smoking gun" is likely to surface, and direct 
evidence of a conflict is rarely likely to appear in any plan 
administrator's decision. Our reading, we believe, infuses at 
least some meaning into the Firestone regime. 
 
Finally, the unique role of insurance companies within 
ERISA supports our position. ERISA generally requires that 
assets of a benefits plan be "held in trust by one or more 
trustees." 29 U.S.C. S 1103(a). However, this requirement is 
excepted for insurance companies; the requirements that 
the assets be held in a trust does not apply "to assets of a 
plan which consist of insurance contracts or policies issued 
by an insurance company qualified to do business in a 
State." 29 U.S.C. S 1103(b)(1). Therefore,"[i]nasmuch as 
`the basis for the deferential standard for review in the first 
place was the trust nature of most ERISA plans,' the most 
important reason for deferential review is lacking." Brown v. 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 
(11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Moon v. American Home 
Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11th Cir. 1989)). 
 
Our own case law in the general area, set forth in Section 
II.E, supports our conclusion. These opinions are self- 
consciously laden with negative pregnants, suggesting that 
structural bias could heighten the review. For example, we 
noted that the defendants in those cases did not  "incur" a 
"direct expense as a result of the allowance of benefits," or 
"benefit directly from the denial or discontinuation of 
benefits," Abnathya, 2 F.3d at 45 n.5; Mitchell, 113 F.3d at 
437 n.4, implying that a company that did profit directly 
would be subject to a more stringent standard. Likewise, 
the most deferential review was appropriate when the 
employer had "incentives to avoid the loss of morale and 
higher wage demands that could result from denials of 
benefits," Nazay, 949 F.2d at 1335, and there was only a 
"possibility of future indirect consequences to it," Kotrostis, 
970 F.2d at 1173. By negative implication, a heightened 
standard of review would appear to be appropriate when a 
plan funder like an insurance company "incurs a direct 
expense," the consequences to it are direct and 
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contemporary, and, while it has incentives to maintain good 
business relationships, it lacks the incentive to"avoid the 
loss of morale and higher wage demands that result from a 
denial of benefits." We are also supported by the fact that 
the great bulk of district courts in this Circuit have 
interpreted this precedent as mandating heightened 
scrutiny when the insurance company is the insurer and 
makes determinations.7 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, we believe that a higher 
standard of review is required when reviewing benefits 
denials of insurance companies paying ERISA benefits out 
of their own funds. 
 
IV. What Standard of Review? 
 
The question remains, then, what should be the higher 
standard of review? This secondary question is distinct 
from the first: even those courts that find that there is no 
conflict in the insurance company context have struggled 
with how to incorporate a conflict--when theyfind one-- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See Nolen v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 211, 216 (E.D. 
Pa. 1998) (the dual role requires a heightened standard); Morris v. Paul 
Revere Ins. Group, 986 F. Supp. 872, 881-82 (D.N.J. 1997) (same); Rizzo 
v. Paul Revere Ins. Group, 925 F. Supp. 302, 309 (D.N.J. 1996) (same), 
aff 'd, 111 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1997); Nave v. Fortis Bens. Ins. Co., No. 
98- 
3960, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13382 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 25, 1999) ("Fortis's 
dual role as the Plan's claims administrator and as the insurance 
company which insures the benefits provided under the Plan certainly 
creates a genuine or substantial conflict of interest."); Landau v. 
Reliance 
Std. Life Ins. Co., No. 98-903, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3673 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
13, 1999) (following Brown); Sciarra v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 
No. 97-1363, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13786 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1998) 
("[Defendant's] dual role as administrator and insurer of its own plan 
creates a conflict between its providing benefits to claimants and its own 
financial status"); Perri v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 97-1369, 
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12741 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 1997) ("Reliance 
Standard's dual role as administrator and insurer of its own plan creates 
a conflict between its providing benefits to claimants and its own 
financial status."); cf. Marques v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 1999 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 17406 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 1999) ("[T]his Court finds it hard to 
believe that there is not a conflict of interest when the defendant makes 
benefit decisions and pays for benefits out of its own assets."). 
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into the framework of arbitrary and capricious review 
mandated by Firestone. In Kotrosits v. GATX Corp. Non- 
contributory Pension Plan for Salaried Employees, 970 F.2d 
1165, 1173 (3d Cir. 1992) we stated that had a conflict 
existed, Firestone "counsels in favor of withholding 
deference." This suggests de novo review. On the other 
hand, in Abnathya v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1993) we suggested that the circumstances 
might require "special attention or a more stringent 
standard of review under Firestone." Again, we turn to the 
other circuits, where we find three methods of dealing with 
a conflict: burden shifting, de novo review, and the sliding 
scale. 
 
We begin with Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 
898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990), in which the Eleventh 
Circuit turned to the common law of trusts to determine 
the appropriate method for reviewing the conflicted 
discretionary decisions of an insurance company. See 898 
F.2d at 1564. It concluded that while an uninterested 
fiduciary should receive a great deal of deference, common 
law trust cases dictated that the highly conflicted one 
should not; even potentially conflicted decisions were 
closely scrutinized, in part to protect the particular 
beneficiaries in a given case, and in part "to discourage 
arrangements where a conflict arises." Id.  at 1565. The 
court determined that a beneficiary need only show a 
substantial structural conflict of interest in order to shift 
the burden to the fiduciary to demonstrate that the conflict 
did not infect a benefits denial. See id. at 1566. It 
announced the following rule: 
 
       [W]hen a plan beneficiary demonstrates a substantial 
       conflict of interest on the part of the fiduciary 
       responsible for benefits determinations, the burden 
       shifts to the fiduciary to prove that its interpretation of 
       plan provision committed to its discretion was not 
       tainted by self-interest. That is, a wrong but apparently 
       reasonable interpretation is arbitrary and capricious if 
       it advances the conflicting interest of the fiduciary at 
       the expense of the affected beneficiary or beneficiaries 
       unless the fiduciary justifies the interpretation on the 
       ground of its benefit to the class of all participants and 
       beneficiaries. 
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Id. at 1566-67. 
 
To be sure, as a preliminary matter, the court mustfirst 
determine that the fiduciary's decision was " `wrong' from 
the perspective of de novo review." Id. at 1567 n.12. But 
once shifted, the task of justifying the interpretation is by 
no means insurmountable. If the fiduciary can demonstrate 
a routine practice or give other plausible justifications-- 
such as the interests of other beneficiaries--deference may 
be granted. "Even a conflicted fiduciary should receive 
deference when it demonstrates that it is exercising 
discretion among choices which reasonably may be 
considered to be in the interests of the participants and 
beneficiaries." Brown, 898 F.2d at 1568. The kind of 
justification that is given as an example is an assertion, 
supported by evidence, that an insurance company's 
"interpretation of its policy is calculated to maximize the 
benefits available to plan participants and beneficiaries at 
a cost that the plan sponsor can afford (or will pay)." Id. 
The legitimacy of such an assertion should be ascertained 
by looking to, among other things, the consistency of the 
practice, the reasonableness of the "reading" (in that case, 
interpreting a term), and the internal consistency of the 
plan with the proferred reading. See id. 
 
The essence of the Eleventh Circuit's approach is that the 
fiduciary should be accorded deference, but only when 
deciding between options which are all in the best interest 
of the beneficiary or beneficiaries. Insurance companies, 
unlike the typical trustees, may be viewed with some 
skepticism because of the primacy of their profit-making 
function. Therefore, given the structural conflict, the 
administrator of an insurance company funding an ERISA 
plan has the burden of proving that beneficiary interests 
motivated a decision which would be "wrong" under de 
novo review. See id. A version of the Brown approach has 
been followed by several panels of the Ninth Circuit. See, 
e.g., Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 1317, 1322 
(9th Cir. 1995) (given material probative evidence of a 
conflict, the burden is shifted to the denying company to 
give a legitimate justification for a denial). 
 
The Second Circuit, while stringent in requiring 
particular evidence that a conflict infected the 
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decisionmaking process, uses de novo review once it credits 
such evidence. See Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Defense 
Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255-56 (2d Cir. 1996). Unlike the 
Eleventh Circuit, the test outlined in Sullivan  does not 
include burden shifting. "If the court finds that the 
administrator was in fact influenced by the conflict of 
interest, the deference otherwise accorded the 
administrator's decision drops away and the court 
interprets the plan de novo." Id. 
 
Other courts have rejected the shifting burden and 
either/or models, and instead use a sliding scale approach, 
according different degrees of deference depending on the 
apparent seriousness of the conflict. According to the 
Fourth Circuit, "the fiduciary decision will be entitled to 
some deference, but this deference will be lessened to the 
degree necessary to neutralize any untoward influence 
resulting from the conflict." Doe v. Group Hospitalization & 
Medical Services, 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1993). Despite this 
divergence from the Eleventh Circuit's burden shifting, we 
read the Doe court as engaging in a highly demanding 
exercise when it applies this sliding scale, "review[ing] the 
merits of the interpretation to determine whether it is 
consistent with an exercise of discretion by a fiduciary 
acting free of the interests that conflict with those of the 
beneficiaries." Id. 
 
The Fourth Circuit's sliding scale approach has been 
adopted by several other courts. See Vega v. National Life 
Ins. Service, Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 296 (5th Cir. 1999) (en 
banc) (using the sliding scale approach); Chambers v. 
Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818 (10th Cir. 1996) 
("[T]he arbitrary and capricious standard is sufficiently 
flexible to allow a reviewing court to adjust for the 
circumstances alleged, such as trustee bias in favor of a 
third-party or self-dealing by the trustee."); Miller v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 984 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(the arbitrary and capricious standard is "shaped" by the 
circumstances when there is a conflict of interest). Despite 
a feint in the direction of adopting the Brown  approach, see 
Armstrong v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 1263, 1265 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that the "perpetual conflict" which exists 
when an insurer administers benefits from its own plan 
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warrants a de novo standard of review), the Eighth Circuit 
has settled on the sliding scale. See Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 
144 F. 3d 1157, 1165 (8th Cir. 1998) (explicitly adopting 
sliding scale). The First Circuit uses something like the 
sliding scale, testing a decision by measuring its 
"reasonableness" in the context it was made, which 
necessarily includes an awareness of the effects of the 
decision on the parties. Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 
53, 57 (1st Cir. 1999). Reasonableness, notes that court, 
"has substantial bite itself." Id. 
 
We adopt the approach of the sliding scale cases. That 
approach allows each case to be examined on its facts. The 
court may take into account the sophistication of the 
parties, the information accessible to the parties, and the 
exact financial arrangement between the insurer and the 
company. For example, a court can consider whether the 
insurance contract is fixed for a term of years or changes 
annually, and whether the fee paid by the company is 
modified if there are especially large outlays of capital by 
the insurer. 
 
Another factor to be considered is the current status of 
the fiduciary. Our previous cases, discussed supra Section 
II.F, which hold that an employer fiduciary is not conflicted 
generally assume that the company is stable and will act as 
a repeat player: The presumed desire to maintain employee 
satisfaction is based on this premise. When companies are 
breaking up, or laying off a significant percentage of their 
employees, or moving all their operations, these incentives 
diminish significantly. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 216 
("The employer's reputational interest is not likely to be 
effective when the long term relationship between the firm 
and the workers is dissolving, as in a plant closing or in a 
corporate restructuring."). 
 
Furthermore, the sliding scale approach better adheres to 
Firestone's dictate that a conflict should be considered as a 
"factor" in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard. 
489 U.S. at 115. Following Firestone to the Restatement of 
Trusts would counsel that a conflict of interest requires 
tighter review, but not necessarily a shifted burden, when 
the fiduciary is conflicted. "In the determination of the 
question whether the trustee in the exercise of a power is 
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acting from an improper motive the fact that the trustee 
has an interest conflicting with that of the beneficiary is to 
be considered." Restatement (Second) of Trusts S 187, cmt. 
g (emphasis added). Comment (d) lists several factors, 
including conflict of financial interest, to examine whether 
there is an abuse of discretion, stating that the factors 
"may be relevant" and including "the existence or 
nonexistence of an interest in the trustee conflicting with 
that of the beneficiaries." We think the best way to 
"consider" these potentially relevant factors (in this case, 
the structural conflict of interest) is to use them to heighten 
our degree of scrutiny, without actually shifting the burden 
away from the plaintiff. 
 
We acknowledge that there is something intellectually 
unsatisfying, or at least discomfiting, in describing our 
review as a "heightened arbitrary and capricious" standard. 
The locution is somewhat awkward. The routine legal 
meaning of an "arbitrary and capricious" decision is that 
used, quite understandably, by the district court: a decision 
"without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or 
erroneous as a matter of law." Once the conflict becomes a 
"factor" however, it is not clear how the process required by 
the typical arbitrary and capricious review changes. Does 
there simply need to be more evidence supporting a 
decision, regardless of whether that evidence was relied 
upon? 
 
This is unsatisfying. Rather, once "factors" are 
introduced, arbitrary and capricious stops sounding like 
arbitrary and capricious and more like some form of 
intermediate scrutiny, which has no analogue in thisfield. 
As we have seen, other courts have reconciled the sliding 
scale and the "arbitrary and capricious" language from 
Firestone by essentially reformulating the arbitrary and 
capricious standard for ERISA law, concluding that"the 
arbitrary and capricious standard may be a range, not a 
point. . . [it is] more penetrating the greater is the suspicion 
of partiality, less penetrating the smaller that suspicion is." 
Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 
1992) (quoting Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension 
Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1987)); Lowry v. 
Bankers Life & Casualty Retirement Plan, 871 F.2d 522, 
525 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1989) (same). 
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While we also find this explanation wanting, we can find 
no better method to reconcile Firestone's dual commands 
than to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard, and 
integrate conflicts as factors in applying that standard, 
approximately calibrating the intensity of our review to the 
intensity of the conflict. While the approach of Professor 
Langbein, see supra note 2, and of the Eleventh Circuit 
would seem more compatible with the basic principles of 
trust law, and hence a better "fit", only the Supreme Court 
can undo the legacy of Firestone. In sum, we adopt the 
sliding scale approach, and, accordingly, will expect district 
courts to consider the nature and degree of apparent 
conflicts with a view to shaping their arbitrary and 
capricious review of the benefits determinations of 
discretionary decisionmakers. 
 
V. Application 
 
Were we to apply extremely deferential arbitrary and 
capricious review, we would likely affirm the judgment of 
the district court, because there is some credible evidence 
which an administrator could have relied upon to conclude 
that Maria Pinto was not totally disabled. Two doctors, one 
of whom is a specialist in cardiology, stated that they did 
not believe that she was totally disabled. Therefore, 
Reliance Standard's decision was not "without reason, 
unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a 
matter of law." Abnathya, 2 F.3d at 45 (quoting Adamo v. 
Anchor Hocking Corp., 720 F.Supp. 491, 500 (W.D.Pa. 
1989)). On the other hand, were we to apply de novo 
review, we would probably conclude that Reliance Standard 
made the incorrect determination, because Pinto presented 
credible evidence from her long-time treating cardiologist 
that she was totally disabled for cardiological reasons, 
evidence which was affirmed by another cardiologist, and 
only one other cardiologist, who had much less opportunity 
to perform tests and examine her than her own doctor, 
concluded that she was not. According deference to neither 
side, Pinto's case seems stronger. 
 
However, applying a heightened arbitrary and capricious 
review, we are deferential, but not absolutely deferential. 
Like the Fifth Circuit, "[t]he greater the evidence of conflict 
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on the part of the administrator, the less deferential our 
abuse of discretion standard." Vega, 188 F.3d at 297. 
Therefore, we look not only at the result--whether it is 
supported by reason--but at the process by which the 
result was achieved. In so doing, we note several problems. 
First, Reliance Standard reversed its own initial 
determination that Pinto was totally disabled without 
receiving any additional medical information. The only thing 
that changed between Reliance Standard's initial 
acceptance and its subsequent denial was that Pinto 
notified Reliance Standard that her SSA application had 
been rejected (a determination that SSA subsequently 
abandoned). The SSA's rejection of Pinto appears to have 
triggered Reliance Standard's investigation into Pinto's 
disability, suggesting that Reliance Standard places 
significant trust in the SSA process, yet the SSA's 
subsequent reversal had no such effect. Inconsistent 
treatment of the same facts was viewed with suspicion by 
the Brown court. See 898 F.2d at 1569 ("That [the 
insurance company] would reach opposing conclusions on 
the basis of the same evidence seriously challenges the 
assumptions upon which deference is accorded to[its] 
interpretation of the plan."). 
 
Second, looking at the final decision, we see a selectivity 
that appears self-serving in the administrator's use of Dr. 
Bahler's expertise. Reliance Standard used some of Dr. 
Bahler's specific limitations to explain its rejection, but it 
did not accept (or satisfactorily explain its rejection of) his 
conclusion that she was totally disabled. The Fifth Circuit 
addressed a similar circumstance, where the administrator 
credited one part of the advice of a treating doctor, but not 
his other advice. That court held that this was 
unacceptable in the context. See Salley v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1992). This 
inconsistent treatment of the same authority in two 
separate instances (the SSA, Dr. Bahler) raises the 
likelihood of self-dealing. Applying the sliding scale to this 
case, our review is ratcheted upward by these suspicious 
events. 
 
Finally, when a staff worker reviewing the files 
recommended that Pinto be reestablished pending further 
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testing, her suggestion was rejected, and Reliance Standard 
decided to do the opposite: suspend the resumption of 
benefits. Although this in itself does not prove bias, it lends 
further support to the view that whenever it was at a 
crossroads, Reliance Standard chose the decision 
disfavorable to Pinto. The default position was that benefits 
were not granted. 
 
Taking all of these procedural anomalies into account, we 
find ourselves on the far end of the arbitrary and capricious 
"range," and we examine the facts before the administrator 
with a high degree of skepticism.8 
 
Reliance Standard relies heavily on the "two-to-two" 
argument, arguing that because there are two doctors on 
either side of the Pinto disability debate, a decision to credit 
either side cannot be arbitrary and capricious. However, 
neither of the doctors retained by Reliance Standard had 
the same contact with Pinto that Dr. Bahler did. Dr. 
Rosenthal read Dr. Bahler's reports, examined Pinto, and 
talked with her, but this examination, however professional, 
does not compare with the eighteen years of interaction 
between Dr. Bahler and Pinto. The essence of Dr. Bahler's 
conclusion was that Pinto's condition was "labile"; that is, 
her condition could severely worsen under stress or activity 
("high stress situations . . . could precipitate her cardiac 
asthma."). Although she might be able to persist in an 
occupation for some time, and she had basic motor skills, 
the risk of work was too great. Reliance Standard gave no 
explanation for its rejection of this aspect of Dr. Bahler's 
assessment. 
 
Moreover, while Reliance Standard relies on Dr. Capone, 
Dr. Capone is a pulmonologist; he could only, and did only, 
assess whether she had pulmonary problems. The 
pulmonary examination was at Dr. Rosenthal's suggestion, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Our focus on process should not be read to require an additional duty 
to conduct a good faith, reasonable investigation. That is, we are not 
holding that Reliance Standard had a duty to gather more information, 
merely that the decision might have been arbitrary and capricious given 
the information available. Compare Vega, 188 F.3d at 188 (rejecting 
claim that administrator had an affirmative duty to conduct good faith 
and reasonable investigation). 
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but neither Pinto nor Dr. Bahler have suggested that the 
source of her disability was pulmonary. That Dr. Capone 
concluded that she was not disabled by respiratory disease 
should not discredit Dr. Bahler. Moreover, Dr. Capone 
originally suggested that in order to decide whether Pinto 
was disabled, she would first need to undergo therapy to 
see if it made a difference. She never underwent therapy, 
but despite his initial reluctance--and after being pressed-- 
he concluded that she was not totally disabled. If Reliance 
Standard was as accommodating with Dr. Bahler's 
conclusions as it was with Dr. Capone's, it would likely 
have granted Pinto benefits. 
 
For these reasons, a factfinder could conclude that 
Reliance Standard's decision to credit its doctors over Drs. 
Bahler and Goodman was the result of self-dealing instead 
of the result of a trustee carefully exercising itsfiduciary 
duties to grant Pinto the benefits due her under the 
insurance plan. Summary judgment was therefore 
inappropriate, for there is a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether Reliance Standard acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously. The judgment of the District Court will be 
reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. There is sufficient evidence at 
this stage to merit a penetrating review of the decision 
under the heightened standard. The decision was close 
enough that such a review may result in a determination 
that it was arbitrary and capricious. On remand, the 
District Court may take evidence regarding the conflict of 
interest, and ways in which the conflict may have 
influenced the decision, and then determine whether, 
considering the conflict, the decision was "arbitrary and 
capricious" in the sense described in Section IV. 
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